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Father Wassmer believes that the task of evaluating situation ethics
yields to the Christian moralist not only the rejection of errors, but
also a freshness of insight which may help him to see and present
the truth more clearly. It is suggested that the too facile presentation
in some of our manuals of the concept of "acts intrinsically evil in
their object" overextends the true applicationof the concept and, in
the resulting confusion, jeopardizes a correct understanding and
applicationof the Christian moral system.
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OF SITUATION ETHICSt
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T IS A SIMPLIFICATION in philosophical discussion to dismiss a theory

at once by appealing to the refutation of the parent theory to which
it partly owes its origin. All of us do this frequently and consider the
technique adequate and useful for the immediate purpose we have at
hand. We are inclined to sympathize with the principle that there is in
the order of ideas something analogous to the Mendelian genetic theory
in the order of physical characteristics. If we are successful in discovering the defective gene in the parent theory and in establishing with
satisfaction the fact that it is defective, we feel justified in looking upon
the descendants as the unfortunate and inculpable inheritors of this
genetic endowment. It is not surprising therefore to learn that Situation
Ethics has been sufficiently laid to rest in philosophical oblivion by
resorting to the simple device of arguing that this new moral theory
carries within itself the defective genes of Protestant theology and ethical
relativism.
Now let the point be made clear that we are not denying the value and
cogency of any argument that would properly orientate some new speculative theory in its due relation to other theories in the philosophy of
ideas. We do recognize the child in the parent and one certain way of
tThe present article is an extension in some detail of the discussion of certain aspects
of Situation Ethics which appeared in Carr, The Morality of Situation Ethics, 5
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identifying the child is to relate the child to
the parent. Nevertheless, even after this recognition of the child in the parent, the child
still remains there to be explained - enigmatic, mysterious and elusive. So does Situation Ethics.
For this reason
we would prefer to
see more consideration given to Situation Ethics from
within itself or
from the vantage
point of some insights it sheds upon
traditional moral
philosophy. We
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can learn from
error if it causes us to re-examine and reexplore our own position. We shall outline
briefly some ways in which that analysis
might prosper.
Denial of Objective Moral Principles
The principal characteristic of Situation
Ethics in its most rigorous form is its resolution of moral problems independently of
objective moral principles that are radicated
in law. Pope Pius XII, on April 18, 1952,
summed up very pointedly the general
espirit of this new morality:
The distinctive mark of this new morality is
that it is not based in effect upon universal
moral laws, such as, for example, the Ten
Commandments, but on the real and concrete conditions or circumstances in which
men must act, and according to which the
conscience of the individual must judge and
choose. Such a state of things is unique and
is applicable only once for every human action. That is why the decision of conscience,
as the proponents of this ethic assert, cannot

be commanded by ideas, principles, and universal law.1
The situationalist demands that the unique
and total situation be considered in the
moral evaluation of human conduct. In this
confrontation with God in the conscience
of man through the unique concrete situation, general norms are merely indicative
and declarative of God's will, and there is
not required the mediation of law to resolve
the human moral situation. Absolute moral
norms in concrete situations are not valid
for the situationalist-ethician and law never
mediates between the conscience and God.
In fact he insists that ethics and religious
living become increasingly more and more
juridical and moralistic insofar as the mediation of law becomes more and more conspicuous and assertive.
It is not difficult to recognize the parent
in the child and to refer to Existential
Ethics' use of private interpretation in the
moral situation just as Protestant theology
uses private interpretation in doctrinal matters. If your background and training is
philosophical, you will insist upon referring
to this "ethical actualism" (another very
appropriate term used by Pius XII) as
Heraclitean morality of relativism in modern dress. These labels satisfy us for a short
interval but they do not remove the difficulties that an impartial consideration of
the facts will reveal upon closer examination. Let us consider some of the difficulties that are at once apparent.
1 Pius X1I, Ad Delegatas Conventui internationali
Sodalitatis vulgo nuncupatae "Federation Mondiale des .leunesses Fdminines Catholiques," ACTA
APOSTOLICAE SEDS 413, 414 (1952), transi. in
The Moral Law and the "New Morality," 78 IR.
ECCLES. RECORD 138 (1952).
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Negation of Intrinsically Evil Acts
The situationalist demands in the light
of the unique moral situation a confrontation of the conscience with God without
the mediation of absolute immutable law.
He would equivalently deny that there are
any acts that are intrinsically evil in the
rigorous Scholastic meaning of that term.
Such acts according to definition are always
and in every circumstance (semper et pro
semper) in difformity with rational human
nature from their very nature prescinding
from circumstances and end of agent. No
one acquainted with this terminology will
deny the difficulty in finding acts that will
satisfy this definition. Many manuals in
ethics give blasphemy as the sole example
and then offer other meanings for the concept of intrinsic evil which water down the
original significance. The other meanings
for the term unavoidably introduce some
minimal circumstances within the context
of the object or finis operis before concluding to the act's difformity with rational
human nature.
We do not quarrel with this procedure
in introducing other meanings for the term
but we question the silence of the authors
in not -admitting the problems confronting
them when they use the term according to
the strict sense. In fact we wonder whether
there is any necessity in the presentation of
the treatise on the concrete determinants of
a moral act to establish the existence of
intrinsically evil acts only in the rigorous
sense of the term, when there are so few of
them to stand up to the definition. Even
the case of incest presents difficulties for
the moralist and he finds it embarrassing
to call it intrinsically evil from its object in
total isolation of the circumstances and
motive. The iconoclast Shaw made this
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one of his targets in Back to Methuselah.
It should be understood that we are not
saying that there are no intrinsically evil
acts in the abstract but we are insisting
upon the difficulties facing the Scholastic
moralist who would search for such acts in
the strictest meaning of that term and who
would be satisfied with them after they have
been found. It is a more prudent pedagogical method to propose less strict meanings for intrinsically evil acts and to discover
multiple illustrations of these than toinsist
upon the definition for which the fewest
possible examples can be found. Frequently
the impression left with students is that the
treatise on the moral act will be a jerrybuilt structure, because circumstances will
assume too great a role in the moral act,
unless it be established not only that there
exist acts which are always from their objects in difformity with rational human
nature, but also that to discover such difformities is a facile task and one that is
routine in the development and application
of moral science. The proposition that
there are intrinsically evil acts is defensible
whether the term is accepted in the rigorous meaning or not, but pedagogically it
seems unwise to establish the proposition
on grounds that the definition in the strict
sense is easy to find examples for.
The situationalist of course goes much
further than the negation of intrinsically
evil acts in the strict meaning of the term.
He denies also that there are such acts in
the concrete. In fact his argument would
*be an a fortiori transit from the negation
of such acts in the concrete to the necessary
denial of such acts in the abstract. This
rationalization by the situationalist may
need some elaboration.
In the first place, the consideration of a
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moral act in the abstract is the evaluation
of the act from its object or finis operis,
prescinding from the other moral determinants, the circumstances and motive or finis
operantis. If the act so considered from its
object alone is always in difformity with
rational human nature, it is an intrinsically
evil act in the rigorous meaning of the term.
We referred before to less strict meanings
for the concept of intrinsically evil act. One
such meaning refers to an act whose object
includes a condition within itself, the fulfillment of which is requisite for the act
to be considered intrinsically evil. Ethicians refer to "taking someone's property"
as such an act; it becomes evil only if it is
an unjust taking that violates the will of the
owner. Many examples for this meaning
of the term can be given. Possibly the best
example to show the several qualifications
or conditions that must be placed upon an
act before it can be designated intrinsically
evil is that of homicide. Homicide, defined nominally as the killing of a man, becomes intrinsically evil only if all these
qualifications are superimposed upon it:
Direct homicide on one's own authority
outside a case of legitimate self-defense and
capital punishment. If all these qualifications are assumed into a malleable object
or finis operis of homicide, then such homicide may be denominated intrinsically evil
and the proposition concerning the existence of such intrinsically evil acts becomes
easily defensible. However, it should be
realized that the expanding object has now
included within its walls what are really
constitutive and determining circumstances
and that without these the object or finis
operis would be so indeterminate as to
render the act a morally indifferent one.
A third meaning for a 'morally intrinsically evil act arises from the consideration

that under normal circumstances this act
produces evil consequences. Because these
bad consequences consistently follow upon
such an act (polygyny and perfect divorce
are sometimes cited in this connection), it
is called intrinsically evil. Granted the elimination of these destructive consequences
under a special providence of God, such
acts might become permissible. Thus do
some moralists explain the toleration of
divorce and remarriage in the Old Testament. Invoking the terminology of formal
and -material change of law, moralists would
call such a change as this not a formal
change of law but a change in the matter
of the law, with the result that we do not
have the precise kind of polygyny or perfect divorce which are forbidden always
and in every circumstance (semper et pro
semper). We can understand that here we
have no real change in law but a change in
the context of the moral act by special
divine providence. It is not polygyny or
perfect divorce that is intrinsically evil in
itself from its object or finis operis but
polygyny or perfect divorce with these evil
consequences necessarily associated. In
other words, polygyny and perfect divorce
are against the bene esse of marriage and
not against the very esse of marriage.
Cardinal Position of Circumstances
Certainly, if the proposition concerning
the existence of intrinsically evil acts has
such acts in view, then the difficulties are
reduced in finding examples to fulfill this
definition. It would also seem to follow
from this triple meaning of the term that
circumstances do enter more and more into
the confines of the object or the finis operis
and these circumstances are determining and
constitutive sine qua non conditions for
such acts to be considered intrinsically evil.
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When we analyze the moral determinants of
an act according to object, motive, and
circumstances we should constantly recall
that even in the abstract there are very few
acts that do not include some minimal
circumstances within the object itself which
are indispensable to the object before any
inference can be drawn that we have here
an intrinsically evil act. In other words,
circumstances are not only required for an
act in the concrete but even for an act in
the abstract, that is, for an act considered
only from its object, because the object is
clothed with some minimal circumstances
that are determining and constitutive.
This becomes most clear in the examination of the partial truth contained in
Situation Ethics. The situationalist insists
upon the primary role of circumstances and
motive in the moral evaluation of any act
whether the act is considered in the abstract
or in the concrete. He denies that there are
any acts at all which from their objects are
always in difformity with rational human nature. The latter proposition is false and contains the fundamental error of Existential
Ethics. The first proposition on the importance of circumstances in the consideration
of an act in the concrete is a proposition that
is easily understood by the philosopher who
would admit the existence of morally indifferent acts in the abstract and the cardinal
position of circumstances when these same
acts are considered in the concrete. If the
situationalist embarrasses us into recognizing the position of circumstances even
in the consideration of most intrinsically
evil acts in the abstract, then obviously this
truth has' been clarified by a theory which
has manifold errors. Perhaps it is indiscreet
to say that we should be grateful to error
for this clarification and for the refinement
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of what some would call a deeper insight
into truth. It is no small insight into truth
to see that there are the fewest intrinsically
evil acts in the abstract if we accept the
term in the rigorous meaning, and that the
several other meanings of the term undeniably assume within the confines of their
objects circumstances which are necessary
to these objects even in the abstract before
we can denominate such acts intrinsically
evil.
Three Maxims Against Situation Ethics
The interrelationship of the three founts
of morality - the object, motive and circumstances - receives added significance
in the light of our examination. The latter
two determinants in the direct confrontation of the antecedent conscience with God
can never modify essentially and substantially the inner nature of the object or the
finis operis as the situationalist demands.
If the finis operis of h certain act in relation to rational human nature reveals it to
be a deordination, then no circumstances
or motive can ever alter this situation. This
is merely to assert that the specific, essential and intrinsic morality of any act is
derived from the object of the act. Pope
Pius XII insisted upon the importance of
these sources of morality by proposing
three principles of Christianity. 2 First, it
is true that God wants primarily and always
a right intention. Nevertheless the work
itself must be good and the principle of the
end justifying the means must not be employed. It has been pointed out by some
moral philosophers how the wheel of opposition to Christian teaching has gone full
circle. In combating the forensic morality
2 Pius XII, op. cit. supra
ECCLES. RECORD at 140-41.

note 1, transl. 78

1R.
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of the Scribes and Pharisees, Christ had
to emphasize the value of the internal act,
the motive and the intention, and the insufficiency of the external deed unless it be
inspired by the proper motive. In confronting this new theory of Situation Ethics the
Church has to vindicate the insufficiency
of the internal act unless it manifests itself
in the appropriate external good work. Situation Ethics becomes in application a system that is more legalistic and juridical
than the system it would displace. By denying that the internal act receives its essential, specific and intrinsic morality from the
object of the act and by elevating the motive
and circumstances to the status of primary
determinants of the morality of an act, the
situationalist can only judge such an act by
constructing a calculus of motives and circumstances. Eventually he ends up with
a moral mathematicism which he thought
that he had been correct in identifying with
traditional Scholastic morality.
The second principle which the late Holy
Father recalls in the resolution of the moral
conscience is that it is never permitted to
do evil in order that good may result. The
new ethics is constructed on the principle
that the end justifies the means because in
the concrete situation the full morality of
the act is derived from a consideration of
the motive and circumstances and only inadequately from the object or finis operis.
The latter is considered changeable until
the conscience is confronted by God in the
light of the other two sources of morality.
The third principle pointed out by Pius
XII is that there may be situations in which
a man, and especially a Christian, cannot
be unaware that he must sacrifice everything, even his life, in order to save his
soul. The martyrs of all times give adequate
testimony to this truth.

Circumstance and Motive in
Scholastic Ethics
For the Scholastic moralist the problem
of the formation of conscience is one that
does not neglect the importance of the
particular circumstances and the motivation
of the specific individual performing the
act. The personality of the individual is
never overlooked; the role of prudence in
the 'moral situation and the frequency with
which this was brought out in the teaching of
St. Thomas are points stressed by Pius XII:
His [St. Thomas's] treatise evidences a sense
of personal activity and of actuality which
contains whatever true and positive elements
there may be in "ethics according to the situation" while avoiding its confusion and
aberrations. Hence it will be sufficient for
the modern moralist to continue along the
same lines, if he wishes to make a thorough
3
study of the new problem.
It is not by the inversion of the sources
of a moral act that the personality of a man
is found to be worthy of more esteem. A
man does not become a moral man simply
because his motives are irreproachable. All
the determinants must be considered in the
evaluation of a moral act. The concept
of conscience according to Christian principles allows for a sense of personal responsibility and independence but only within
just and legitimate limits. Those limits are
established by understanding precisely the
nature of the intrinsically evil act which
can never become morally good simply
because of the uniqueness of the circumstances in which a particular individual is
placed. For the situationalist the individual
must make his moral judgment entirely on
the basis of the actual circumstances in
3 Pius

XII, op cit. supra note 1, transl. 78 IR.
at 141.
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which he finds himself and his conscience
cannot be hampered by ideas, principles
and universal laws or by acts whose very
nature is to be intrinsically evil. In substance, the situationalist takes issue with
the moral philosopher on the very existence of intrinsically evil acts regardless
of how such acts may be defined.
Situation Ethics becomes for its proponents a theological approbative theory of
ethics in that the moral evaluation of an
act is not to be found in the unauthoritative approvals of human individuals but
rather in the authoritative omniscient approvals of God making Himself manifest
before the individual conscience. To this
extent the theory of the new morality participates in a long history of ethical thought.
At the present time the formulation of the
theclogical approbative theory is expressed
mostly in the works of Protestant theologians who are deeply impressed by the
traditional conceptions of the absolute
sovereignty of God and the sinfulness and
overwhelming helplessness of man divorced
from divine revelation and grace. They
rebel against the doctrines of man's necessary evolution towards progress and natural
goodness. They contend that God reveals
Himself not only in historical revelation but
also privately in the individual deliverances
of conscience. The influence of the nineteenth-century Danish theologian Kierkegaard cannot be denied in this association
because he has made so much of the
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thought of the nature of man and God of
the sixteenth-century Reformers pertinent
to this twentieth century.
Conclusion
Possibly in the approach taken here
towards Situation Ethics we have only confounded what to others is obvious. However, by an analysis of the theory from
within itself we ought to discover deeper
insights into the treatise on the determinants of a moral act. In this way we will
more easily expose the real roots of the
error and absorb the partial truth that is
contained in Situation Ethics. The extreme
form of this moral system denies the cardinal role of the object or finis operis as the
specific, essential and intrinsic determinant
of the moral act. There precisely is the
error. The insight of the theory, which to us
is profound, is the realization that inadequacies arise from any consideration of
the determinants of morality in isolation
from one another. The theory forces us to
admit that there are few acts which from
their objects are always in difformity with
an adequate consideration of human nature.
When we offer alternative meanings for
"intrinsically evil acts" we are implicitly
admitting that circumstances in multiple
acts together with the objects are the controlling determinant. In fact it makes this
moralist wonder whether we ought not to
revamp the treatise on the determinants
and present it in a different form.

